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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
MILLS V. GABRIEL: A PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE APPRAISAL
Introduction
The replacement of the horse and buggy by the automobile pro-
duced multiple social and legal problems and as a result of stringent
common law rules operating upon this new means of transporta-
tion, many victims of personal and property injuries were left with-
out an effective legal remedy. Corrective statutory measures were
enacted sporadically, but frequently they were subverted by regres-
sive or anomalous concepts as a consequence of the judicial con-
struction process. Mills v. Gabriel 1 aptly illustrates this tendency.
It is the purpose of this note to present the Mills doctrine as
it manifests itself in the procedural realm, and in addition, to treat
critically its substantive value and desirability. With such as an
objective, it becomes necessary to consider briefly common law and
statutory precedents.
Common Law and Statutory Background 2
The liability of an automobile owner for injury resulting from
the negligence of his driver was limited by the common law to three
clearly defined situations. The first of these was governed by the
classic maxim respondeat superior. Thus an owner would be sub-
jected to liability when a master-servant or principal-agent relation-
ship existed, if the servant or agent was acting within the scope of
his authority in furtherance of the master's or principal's business.3
Again, the owner would be held liable by the common law when he
was physically present in the automobile at the time of the accident.
This so-called "presence" theory was a concomitant of the presump-
tion of control over the driver by the owner.4 Finally, an owner
would be vicariously liable when he entrusted his vehicle to a known
incompetent, thereby setting in motion a dangerous instrumentality. 5
1259 App. Div. 60, 18 N. Y.' S. 2d 78 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd inem., 284
N. Y. 755, 31 N. E. 2d 512 (1940).2 See Note, 16 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 222 (1942), for an extensive analysis
of this subject matter.
3 Psota v. Long Island R. R., 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927) ; Potts
v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. E. 78 (1917); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson,
220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917); cf. Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N. Y 344,
178 N. E. 553 (1931).
4 Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N. Y. 344, 178 N. E. 553 (1931); cf. Potts v.
Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. E. 78 (1917). However, the mere presence of
the owner would not of itself render him conclusively liable. The presumption
underlying this vicarious liability could be effectively rebutted by the owner's
establishing the absence of control over the driver. Ferris v. Sterling, 214
N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915); cf. Piwowarski v. Cornwell, 273 N. Y. 226,
7 N. E. 2d 111 (1937).
5 Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293 N. Y. Supp. 147 (2d
Dep't 1937). See RESTATEMENT, ToiRs § 390 (1934).
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As a plaintiff, an owner could succeed in a property damage suit 6
only where no liability would have been imputed to him if he were
a defendant. Hence whenever an owner would be vicariously liable
as a defendant, the common law would impute to him the contribu-
tory negligence of his driver so as to preclude a recovery. 7
However, a bailor was not subjected to liability for the negli-
gence of his bailee.8  As a direct result of this strict common law
attitude, which oppressed those who were unable to bear the loss,
rather than those who were best able to make reparations, viz.,
the owners, the New York Legislature enacted Section 282-e of the
Highway Law 9 in 1924, the substance of which was subsequently
set forth in Section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.' 0 Under
Section 59, the negligence of a bailee driver renders the bailor owner
liable and responsible when the vehicle is lawfully operated upon
a public highway with the express or implied permission of the
owner.
It has been held that Section 59 does not affect the common law
relation of master and servant upon proof that the servant's negli-
gence occurred in his master's business."' Gochee v. Wagner 12 holds
that Section 59 does not change the common law rule rendering liable
an owner who is present in the automobile at the time of the acci-
dent and who is presumed to be in control. Thus Section 59 has
effected no change in the common law rules of liability; it has merely
created an additional liability.'3 Therefore it has no applicability
to master-servant or principal-agent relationships, but is limited to
the bailor-bailee situation.
Mills v. Gabriel' 4
The Mills case came within the purview of Section 59; yet
common law precedents were relevant by way of analogy. It in-
6 Since the common law "presence" doctrine still obtains, cases wherein an
owner seeks recovery for personal injuries will not be dealt with herein. In
such cases, the owner, necessarily being present at the time of the accident,
will be denied recovery if he fails to rebut the presumption of control.
7 PRossER, TORTS 417 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 485, 486 (1934).
8 Dennis v. Glynn, 262 Mass. 233, 159 N. E. 516 (1928); cf. Piquet v.
Wazelle, 288 Pa. 463, 136 Atl. 787 (1927); PRossaR, TORTS 500 (1941).9 Laws of N. Y. 1924, c. 534.20 Laws of N. Y. 1929, c. 54.
11 Irwin v. Klein, 271 N. Y. 477, 3 N. E. 2d 601 (1936). However, even
though a driver is nominally an "employee," if he were acting on his own
behalf at the time of the accident, the owner may be liable under Section 59
upon a bailor-bailee theory. St. Andrassy v. Mooney, 262 N. Y. 368, 186
N. E. 867 (1933).
12257 N. Y. 344, 178 N. E. 553 (1931).
13 Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N. Y. 344, 178 N. E. 553 (1931) ; Psota v. Long
Island R. R., 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927). That Section 59 has
abrogated the common law rule of non-liability is undisputed.
14 See note 1 supra.
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volved a property damage suit wherein the plaintiff's automobile
was operated by a bailee, for his own purposes, with the absentee
owner's permission. The defendant was the operator of his own
automobile. Negligence on the part of both drivers being established,
the defendant argued, relying upon common law parallelism, that
Section 59 sanctioned the imputation of the bailee driver's negligence
so as to preclude a recovery by the owner. This contention was
rejected by the Appellate Division, whose language is of significance
in view of the memorandum affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
After stating that at common law an owner was not liable for
the negligence of a bailee driver and, therefore, that contributory
negligence was not imputed to such an owner, the court continued:
The statute does not change the common-law rule respecting the owner's
right to recover from third persons under the circumstances disclosed by this
record. Nor may it be invoked for the purpose of imputing the operator's
negligence to the owner. It is applicable for that purpose only in actions
brought by third persons against the owner .... It is suggested that if the
statute does not apply, then the owner of each vehicle may recover against the
other for property damage if both operators were bailees at the time of the
accident, even though both were negligent.1 5 This was always the rule at
common law.16
Extension of the Mills Doctrine
The Mills doctrine, under which the negligence of a bailee driver
constitutes no bar to a property damage suit by an automobile owner,
but yet renders the selfsame owner liable when sued by a third party,
has become an imposing and controlling precedent in the New York
courts. Its ultimate implications were suggested in Bandych v. Ross 17
and Gosselin v. Harrell,18 the fact patterns of which are procedurally
significant.
In the Bandych case, the plaintiff owner instituted a property
damage suit against the defendant owner and his son, who was op-
erating his father's automobile in his absence, but with his permission
and not in his business. The plaintiff's bailee was operating the
plaintiff's automobile under like circumstances. A counterclaim was
filed bythe defendant owner based upon his property damage. Find-
ings that the collision resulted from the concurring negligence of
both drivers were amply supported by the evidence. The court, in
holding that such negligence was not imputable to either owner,
allowed each owner to recover from the other by means of a mutual
15 This contention was the basis for the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Hagarty. See Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 62, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 78, 81
(2d Dep't 1940).
36 Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 62, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 78, 80 (2d Dep't
1940). In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Division adopted a construc-
tion which had been emphatically denounced five years earlier by Wilder, J.,
in Darrohn v. Russell, 154 Misc. 753, 277 N. Y. Supp. 783 (Rochester City Ct.
1935).
1726 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (Utica City Ct. 1941).
1s 194 Misc. 275, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 550 (Schenectady City Ct. 1949).
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set-off, which resulted in the awarding of one judgment in favor of
the plaintiff.19 In passing, the court commented upon the illogical
result which followed the application of the Mills doctrine; that per-
mitting an equitable adjustment such as this in a negligence action
seemed to be a departure from established legal principles.
20
The Gosselin case likewise presents an example of the debatable
conclusion to which the Mills case leads. It involved a collision
causing damage to three automobiles, respectively owned by plain-
tiff A, plaintiff B, and defendant C. The operators of the automo-
biles owned by A and C were bailees, driving in the absence of their
respective bailors, with their permission, but not on their business.
Due to the concurring negligence of the bailees, the automobile of
B, which was parked nearby, was struck and damaged by C's auto-
mobile. Thereupon A instituted a property damage suit against C,
wherein C counterclaimed, and B instituted a like suit against A and
C. In the suit between A and C, the court held that C was liable
to A because the negligence of his bailee was imputed to C by Section
59. Likewise, A was liable for C's damages. Relying upon the
Mills case, the court held that neither owner was precluded from re-
covering his damages in full. Therefore a judgment was rendered
for plaintiff A against defendant C, and a judgment was rendered
for C, on his counterclaim, against A. 21 In B's suit against A and
C, both defendants were held liable as joint tortfeasors and a judg-
ment for B was rendered against them.
Procedural Significance and Practical Aspects of the Mills Doctrine 22
The Bandych and Gosselin cases clearly indicate the manner in
which the Mills case enhances the value of the many procedural "time
savers" which the New York Civil Practice Act makes available to
litigants of a property damage controversy. We next proceed to
analyze the effective implementation of these procedural devices.
Assuming a typical fact pattern under the Mills principle, the
plaintiff owner would institute a property damage suit against the
defendant owner and also, in the usual case, against the bailee driver
of the defendant's automobile. Thereupon, the defendant owner
would interpose a counterclaim, for his property damage, against the
29 Temethod by which the court arrived at this conclusion is presented
with clarity in the carefully reasoned opinion of Walsh, J. The procedural
question which was raised at the hearing of the plaintiff's motion to correct
the judgment, due to the different grounds upon which the liability of the de-
fendants was predicated, is omitted herein.2 0 Bandych v. Ross, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 830, 834 (Utica City Ct 1941).
21 It should be noted that separate judgments were rendered here in favor
of the respective owners, while in the Bandych case, as a result of a mutual
set-off pursuant to Section 477 of the Civil Practice Act, one judgment was
rendered.22 The material herein is based upon an interview with the legal department
of a large automobile liability insurance carrier and upon an appraisal, in the
light of the Civil Practice Act, of relevant case materials. Also see note 6
supra as to scope limitations.
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plaintiff owner. Such practice is authorized by Section 266 of the
Civil Practice Act.
It would be very much to the defendant's advantage for him to
bring the plaintiff's bailee into the action as a party, for upon the
successful prosecution of his cause of action, the defendant could
recover judgments against both the plaintiff owner and the plain-
tiff's bailee. As indicated by Warren v. May,23 such an individual
could be made a party, in the discretion of the court, by bringing
a separate action against him and then moving for consolidation pur-
suant to Section 96 of the Civil Practice Act, or by a motion to
bring him into the action as an additional defendant pursuant to
Section 193(2). Such discretion will not be exercised in the latter
instance.24 While Section 271 of the Civil Practice Act authorizes
the defendant to counterclaim against the plaintiff "along with" an-
other person, thereby adding such person as a party defendant, it
".. . is primarily intended to permit a joinder of parties defendant
only in contract actions where there is a joint liability or in some
tort cases where the liability arises in the same acts of fraud or
conspiracy, or under other circumstances where the proof against one
defendant will be the same as against another.... It was not intended
to be operative where the liability is joint and several and different
proof will be required in establishing the cause of action against the
parties brought in." 25
In bringing the defendant's bailee into the action as a party de-
fendant, the plaintiff owner may avail himself of the same procedural
devices which are enumerated above as available to the counterclaim-
ing defendant owner. However, the plaintiff may avoid any pro-
cedural difficulties, since the implementation of the measures is within
the discretion of the court, by naming such bailee as a party defendant
in the first instance, pursuant to Section 212(2) of the Civil Practice
Act.26
If the defendant's bailee has been joined as a party defendant,
the defendant owner may assert a cross-claim against him for in-
demnity pursuant to Section 264 of the Civil Practice Act. In the
event that the plaintiff does not join such bailee as a party defendant,
23 243 App. Div. 620, 276 N. Y. Supp. 520 (2d Dep't 1935) (negligence
action).
24 A motion to add the plaintiff's bailee as a party defendant under the
counterclaimed cause of action, pursuant to Rule 102(2) of the Rules of
Civil Practice, which authorizes a motion to add or drop parties, should fare
no better than one made under Section 193(2) of the Civil Practice Act, if
the reasoning in the Warren case is applicable.
25 Warren v. May, 243 App. Div. 620, 276 N. Y. Supp. 520, 522 (2d Dep't
1935) (negligence action). Accord, Zauderer v. Market St. Long Beach
Realty Corp., 128 Misc. 364, 218 N. Y. Supp. 669 (Sup. Ct. 1926), affd inein.,
221 App. Div. 760, 222 N. Y. Supp. 925 (2d Dep't 1927).
26 Cuban-Canadian Sugar Co., S. A. v. Arbuckle, 127 Misc. 64, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1926). It should be noted that the amendment to this




the defendant owner may vouch-in the bailee, or implead him pur-
suant to Section 193-a of the Civil Practice Act.27 Impleader un-
doubtedly would be the sounder practice, for it enables the defendant
to seek indemnity from the actual tortfeasor in the same action, in the
event that he is held vicariously liable to the plaintiff; whereas if he
utilizes the vouching-in method, the defendant must prosecute an
independent suit against his bailee for indemnity. These indemnity
provisions likewise are available to the plaintiff as against his bailee
in the action under the defendant's counterclaim.
Further pertinent procedural measures reveal themselves when
there is a slight variation in the assumed fact pattern. Should the
plaintiff choose to sue the defendant owner and the defendant's bailee
separately, any of the three parties could subsequently move to con-
solidate the two actions pursuant to Section 96 of the Civil Practice
Act. Consolidation would also be available where the defendant
owner interposes a counterclaim against the plaintiff owner, but
chooses to sue the plaintiff's bailee separately. Should actions be
pending in different courts, i.e., courts whose jurisdictions differ,
Section 97, which authorizes consolidation under such circumstances,
may be invoked.
Instead of moving to consolidate, the parties may utilize Section
96-a of the Civil Practice Act, which authorizes joint trials of two
or more actions without consolidation. The chief difference between
consolidation and jointly trying two or more actions is in the re-
sulting judgment. Consolidation implies a merger of two or more
actions with the eventual rendition of one judgment. Jointly trying
two or more actions produces no such merger and separate judgments
are rendered.
Thus it can be seen that the procedural device of consolidation
readily adapts itself to the application of the Mills doctrine, which
enables the respective owners to set-off their awarded damages. How-
ever, the same result is more easily accomplished where the defendant
owner interposes a counterclaim in the action prosecuted by the
plaintiff owner, rather than instituting an independent suit and there-
after resorting to consolidation. Bandych v. Ross 28 illustrates the
counterclaim method and the use of a set-off, pursuant to Section
477 of the Civil Practice Act, with the court rendering one judgment
for the set-off residue. However, in Gosselin v. Harrell,29 the court
rendered separate judgments under circumstances similar to those
appearing in the Bandych case. It is submitted that the Bandych
case reflects the sounder practice. Since the Mills case sanctions
recoveries by both owners, it would appear to be more feasible for
a court to render one judgment in favor of the owner who is en-
titled to recover the residue, after setting-off the respective recover-
2 7 See Green v. Hudson Shoring Co., 191 Misc. 297, 301, 77 N. Y. S. 2d
842, 846 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
28 See note 17 supra.29 See note 18 supra.
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ies, than to render separate judgments in favor of each owner. Diffi-
culties as to who should satisfy which judgment first would be com-
pletely avoided by such practice.
The foregoing treatment is limited to cases wherein automobile
liability insurance carriers are not involved on behalf of eithei owner.
Where such carriers are involved, a modification in the use of the
procedural devices heretofore discussed is effected.
Generally an insurance carrier will attempt to effectuate a set-
tlement by way of compromising claims asserted against it and/or
its insured. Therefore litigation ensues only as a last resort. When
litigation does arise, everyone connected with the subject matter
usually will be named or impleaded as a party to the action. This
is so notwithstanding that recoveries will not be permitted as against
all of the named parties. Thus a carrier will bring its insured's
bailee into the action, although the so-called "omnibus clause," which
is a statutory requirement for liability policies issued by New York
insurers,80 covers not only the owner but in addition any other per-
son, with exceptions not pertinent here, lawfully operating or using
the insured's vehicle. Since the bailee is an insured person within
the meaning of the policy, the insurer cannot be subrogated to the
rights of the owner in this instance, because a carrier may not pro-
ceed against its insured for the purpose of indemnification. With
the carrier assuming the liability of the owner, the advantage gained
by cross-claiming, impleading, or vouching-in the bailee entirely dis-
appears. The owner cannot both "eat his cake and have it"; his
indemnification by the insurer precludes a similar indemnification
by his bailee. The purpose in naming or impleading a bailee as a
party is to facilitate any subsequent examination before trial, for
Section 288 of the Civil Practice Act is more liberal with respect
to' the examination of parties than it is with respect to the examina-
tion of witnesses.
A carrier is bound by contract to represent its insured when a
claim within the policy's liability coverage is asserted. However,
such is not the case with respect to property damage suffered by the
insured unless collision coverage was also procured. If such cover-
age was obtained, the carrier not only will defend but also will
prosecute a counterclaim3 1 on behalf of the insured. In the absence
of such coverage, the insured must retain private counsel for the
purpose of maintaining a counterclaim in the action wherein the in-
surer represents the insured with respect to liability coverage, or
must retain such for the purpose of instituting a separate suit to
recover for his damages.
Attention must be drawn to the use of the so-called "loan agree-
ment." Section 210 of the Civil Practice Act provides that "every
30 N. Y. IxsuRANCA LAW § 167(2).
31 Since the counterclaim method usually is more feasible and less expensive,
the carrier will rarely institute a separate action in such cases.
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action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
Obviously if the insurer were to indemnify its insured with respect
to collision coverage, it could no longer maintain an action or counter-
claim for indemnity against the other owner or his bailee in the name
of its insured, since by subrogation, the carrier has succeeded the
insured as the real party in interest. Knowing that juries have a
tendency to be prejudiced against insurers, the carriers resorted to
the device of the loan agreement, whereunder the insured actually is
reimbursed for his collision damage, but such indemnity is treated
as an advance or loan. This fictitious loan, which has been approved
by the courts, is to be "repaid" upon the successful prosecution of
the insured's claim, wherein he appears as the real party in interest.
With the 1950 amendment to Section 210,82 the Legislature has af-
fixed its approval to the sophistry of the loan agreement by declaring
an insured person, who executes a loan agreement to an insurer, to
be a real party in interest.
When two different carriers represent the plaintiff owner and
the defendant owner in an action wherein the defendant counter-
claims, a question arises as to the form of the judgments, viz., whether
a single judgment should be rendered as a result of a set-off or
whether separate judgments should be rendered. As indicated above,
the better practice would seem to be the rendition of a single judg-
ment. However, since each carrier is bound by contract to make full
reparations for injury caused by its insured, a set-off cannot properly
be employed in such a case.33 The insurance carriers have resolved
this problem by submitting such controversies involving two or more
carriers to arbitration societies. Where only one of the parties is
insured, there would seem to be no objection to employing the set-
off, with the resulting rendition of one judgment. Where the same
carrier represents both owners, arbitration would seem to be the
logical remedy; to hold otherwise would be to stamp approval upon
a situation wherein the same carrier both seeks and resists a recovery.
A discussion of the practical aspects of the Mills principle would
be incomplete without some consideration of the husband-wife sit-
uation. It is a matter of common knowledge that many husbands
place the nominal title to their automobiles in their wives' names as
a security measure, while retaining the control and, in many in-
stances, the exclusive use of the vehicle Such manipulations are
of no significance under the Mills doctrine, which views the one
in whom the title reposes as the true owner. Therefore, despite the
fact that the husband-driver is negligent and despite the fact that he
maintains exclusive control over the automobile, the "owner"-wife
may recover for property damage notwithstanding that the very funds
recovered may pass into the exclusive control of the husband.
32 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 529.
33 This may explain the rendition of separate judgments in the Gosselin
case, supra note 21 and text thereto.
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Substantive Appraisal and Recommendations
Many jurists have criticized the doctrine promulgated by the
Mills case, some doing so even prior to its formulation in 1940. This
is best illustrated by the well-considered opinion of Mr. Justice Wilder
in Darrohn v. Russell.84 There, in a situation similar to those ap-
pearing in the subsequently decided Bandych and Gosselin cases, the
court dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaim, holding that
an owner is barred by the negligence of his bailee. Similarly, the
court imputed the bailee's negligence to a plaintiff owner in Renza v.
Brennan,35 and, although the Mills doctrine governed the decision
in the Bandych case,36 the court deplored its startling and illogical
consequence and approved the rationale of the Darrohn case. More
recently, the result flowing from the application of the Mills prin-
ciple has been termed an "apparently anomalous situation." 37 Yet,
despite criticisms and recommendations from members of the bench
and of the bar, the Legislature has seen fit to suffer the continuation
of an altogether arbitrary doctrine-- a doctrine not consonant with
the bases for the common law rules of liability and non-liability.
The common law rule concerning contributory negligence, im-
puting such to a master or principal, was sound both in principle
and in purpose. One who has the choice, freely exercised, in select-
ing another to act in his behalf should be responsible for any derelic-
tion on the part of such selectee which causes injury to innocent
third persons, and this is so whether he be a plaintiff or a defendant.
The same reasoning should be applicable to the Mills situation. An
owner should be required to entrust his vehicle to one who is both
a competent and a conscientious operator. Having the opportunity
to select such an operator, and being subject to a statutory liability
for any injury caused by his operator, an owner should fare no
better when he assumes the status of a plaintiff than he does in the
capacity of a defendant. To argue otherwise is to sanction the grant-
ing of both an undeserved and an unwarranted privilege. Section
59 was enacted to protect innocent third parties, and their welfare
is not enhanced by an extension of benefits to one who voluntarily
entrusts to another a force capable of incalculable destruction. As
was stated in the Darrohn case with reference to the argument ad-
vanced and supported in the subsequent Mills construction of Sec-
tion 59: "Is it both a sword and a shield? Does it impale him [the
owner] upon a new liability to third persons but protect him from
responsibility for his own damage?" 8
3 154 Misc. 753, 277 N. Y. Supp. 783 (Rochester City Ct. 1935) (excellent
critique of Mills doctrine). ,
35 165 Misc. 96, 300 N. Y. Supp. 221 (Westchester County Ct. 1937).
36 See note 20 supra and text thereto.
3 Cote v. Autocar Sales & Service Co., 191 Misc. 988, 991, 79 N. Y. S.
2d 130, 133 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
ss Darrohn v. Russell, 154 Misc. 753, 754, 277 N. Y. Supp. 783, 785 (Roches-
ter City Ct. 1935).
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Realizing this fallacious position, other jurisdictions have taken
steps to impute contributory negligence to the owner. The Iowa
court, in Secured Finance Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.,39 held,
under a statute similar in substance to Section 59, that the contribu-
tory negligence of a bailee was imputable to the owner so as to pre-
clude his recovery. The court stated, as the reason for the refusal
by the common law to impute contributory negligence to a bailor,
,that since a bailor was not liable as a defendant for the negligence
of his bailee, the bailee's contributory negligence was not imputed
to him as a plaintiff. When such reason fell, due to the enactment
of a statutory liability, the rule of non-imputation itself fell for want
of a proper reason to support it. It has been held in Michigan 40
that, since an owner would be liable as a defendant under the applica-
ble statutory provision, the contributory negligence of his bailee
would be imputed to him when he assumed the role of a plaintiff.41
In Louisiana 4 it was held under a statute imposing liability upon
a father for the negligent acts of his son, that a plaintiff father was
precluded from recovering damages for injury to his automobile as a
result of a collision in which his son was contributorily negligent.
California's statute, which had been almost identical to Section
59, was amended in 1937 so as to impute the negligence of the op-
erator to the owner "for all purposes of civil damages." 43 The
California court in Milgate v. Wraith 44 held that such amendment
was constitutional and that it conclusively effected a bar to an action
by the owner. In answer to the plaintiff's contention that the Mills
principle should be considered in construing the California statute,
the court stated that since the statute in view of the 1937 amendment
was no longer similar to that which was operative in New York,
the Mills case was of no weight in construing it.
Although the New York courts are responsible for the promulga-
tion and the preservation of the Mills principle, the creators of Sec-
tion 59 planted the seed from which it germinated. Therefore leg-
islative action is required as the means by which this "hybrid"
formula is to be revamped, if it is to be revamped at all. As was
pointed out in the Mills case itself: "If the statute operates illogic-
ally or unjustly it is for the Legislature and not the courts to extend
its scope." 45
39207 Iowa 1105, 224 N. W. 88 (1929).4o Meisenheimer v. Pullen, 271 Mich. 509, 260 N. W. 756 (1935).
41To the same effect is National Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64
A. 2d 304 (D. C. Mun. App. 1949) (statute created an agency relationship).
42 Di Leo v. Du Montier, 195 So. 74 (La. App. 1940).
43 CA. VEHIcXL CODE § 402 (1935), as amended, CAL. STATs. 1937, p. 2353.
44 19 Cal. 2d 297, 121 P. 2d 10 (1942) (containing an excellent review of
the earlier New York cases holding contrary to the subsequent Mills doctrine).
45 Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 62, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 78, 81 (2d Dep't
1940).
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Such legislative action was attempted, but proved to be unsuc-
cessful. On February 18, 1948, a bill 46 was introduced in the New
York Assembly, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
§ 59. Negligence and contributory negligence of operator other, than owner
attributable to owner. Every owner of a motor vehicle... operated upon a
public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person
or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle . . . , in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person
legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied,
of such owner. The contributory negligence of any person legally using or
operating a motor vehicle . . . , with the permission of the owner express or
implied, in the business of such owner or otherwise shall be imputable to such
owner.
After its introduction, the proposal was referred to committee,
from which it was never reported out. To pigeonhole such a cor-
rective measure is to perpetuate New York's adherence to a basically
unsound rule. Other jurisdictions have taken the initiative, so far
as similar statutes were concerned, and it remains to be seen for
how long a period New York will be content to lag behind. It is
submitted that "By amending the Vehicle and Traffic Law so that
the negligence of the driver will be imputed to the owner in all cases
where the vehicle is used with his consent, express or implied, the
legislature may achieve a result that is uniformly just." 4I
THE "Now oR HEREAFTER ACQUIRED PERSONAL PROPERTY" CLAUSE
Introduction
Nowhere in the New York Law of Mortgages is "judicial sur-
gery" and accurate statutory draftsmanship more needed than in
that aspect of the law which treats of "personalty" clauses in real
property mortgages. Hindered by loose language,' stare decisis,2
4 61948 Sess. Int. 2260, Pr. No. 2414, introduced by Assemblyman Samuel
Roman. At the same time, Senator Seymour Halpern introduced a similar
bill in the New York Senate, 1948 Sess. Int. 1910, Pr. No. 2092.
47Note, 16 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 222, 230 (1942).1 See note 26 infra.
21n a speech made before the New York State Bar Association, Judge
Cardozo said: ". . . bearing in mind the fact that sellers of the ranges under
contracts of conditional sale had made their sales in the faith that the ranges
were personalty merely, and had refrained from taking measures to protect
themselves by recording their bills of sale in ways that would have been ap-
propriate if they had supposed that the ranges were annexations to the land
S.. a majority of the court believed that in view of the probable reliance by
innocent parties upon a decision which the same majority would have refused
to make if the question had been a new one, there was nothing to do except
[ VOL. 25
